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1. Introduction 
 
In an interesting paper, Blacconiere, Frederickson, Johnson, and Lewis (BFJL, 2011) 
study voluntary firm disclosures that “disavow” the reliability of estimates of option expense. As 
they define it, a disavowal is a disclosure that questions the reliability of the option expense 
estimate. As an example, BFJL provide a disavowal disclosure from Intel’s 2001 annual report in 
which Intel concludes that option pricing models “do not necessarily provide a reliable single 
measure of the fair value of employee stock options.” Much prior research shows that managers 
manipulate option values disclosed in proxy statements (Murphy, 1996; Yermack, 1998; Baker, 
1999), and manipulate option expense disclosed in 10-K footnotes (Aboody et al. 2006; Hodder 
et al. 2006; Bartov et al. 2007). Given this evidence that managers manipulate numeric option 
expense estimates, it is interesting to consider whether managers use verbal reliability 
disavowals opportunistically to mitigate shareholder perceptions of option compensation. I 
compliment the authors for identifying a new and interesting angle that extends our knowledge 
of the highly-researched SFAS 123 setting. More important, this study adds to recent research 
such as Li (2010) that considers managers’ joint choice of numeric and written disclosure. The 
BFJL study suggests the importance of considering how managers jointly choose their disclosure 
strategies for numeric and written disclosures. 
Although BFJL have some interesting findings of a positive correlation between lobbying 
against SFAS 123 and disavowing, the main thrust of BFJL is to examine whether disavowals 
are opportunistic or informative disclosures. To do this, they use properties of managers’ 
volatility estimates as proxies for the reliability of the option value estimate, and conduct three 
tests. The first test examines whether disavowals are positively associated with proxies for 
opportunism and/or ex ante proxies for difficulty in forecasting volatility. In the second test, they 
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examine volatility forecast bias for disavowal firms. Biased volatility forecasts suggest 
opportunism, and therefore opportunistic disavowals. Similar to the first set of tests, the third set 
of tests correlates disavowals with difficulty in forecasting volatility. If disavowals are 
informative, firms with disavowals should exhibit greater forecast difficulty. Overall, the results 
of the tests are consistent with disavowals being informative, and BFJL find little evidence 
consistent with opportunism. 
In the remainder of my discussion, I concentrate on three aspects of BFJL that I find 
intriguing. First, the disavowal disclosure itself is interesting. One approach to understanding 
verbal disclosure is to take big sweeps through annual report texts and to computer-code patterns 
in the language into summary measures (e.g., Core, 2001; Li, 2011). This approach likely misses 
texture that can be gained through a “close reading,” as in BFJL’s examination of the stock 
option footnote and their discovery of the disavowal disclosure. In the next section, I take a close 
look at the disavowal disclosure language, and suggest that the disclosure is not a model of 
transparency. The phrasing “not necessarily … reliable” appears common to most of the 
disavowals, and while it does raise a question about reliability, it is a weak question. Similar to 
saying “may not be reliable,” saying “not necessarily reliable” instead of “not reliable” converts 
a strong claim to a claim that is always true. Given the weakness of the question about reliability, 
it is perhaps surprising that more companies do not raise the question – only about 12% of 
BFJL’s sample disavow. Related to this, it seems puzzling that the disavowals in BFJL seem 
largely to stop with the adoption of SFAS 123R, and I examine this in Section 3. Here I find that 
“not necessarily … reliable” does seem to vanish, but other phrasing suggesting lack of 
reliability, including stronger phrasing such as “highly subjective assumptions,” persists. 
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Finally, most puzzling is the lack of findings on opportunism, and I examine this in 
Section 4. Ex ante, it seems plausible that managers have incentives to manage option expense 
downward: managers bear costs if shareholders and outsiders perceive their pay to be excessive, 
higher option expense suggests lower profitability, and unlike most other accruals, if option 
estimates are downward-biased, they will not be adjusted upward in a subsequent period 
(Aboody et al., 2006). BJFL’s findings seem especially puzzling given that the disavowal 
disclosure in many cases seems non-transparent and not particularly informative. As BFJL 
suggest, part of the reason for the lack of findings on opportunism may be that the volatility 
estimate is a weak proxy for manipulation of option value.1 However, as I discuss below, I 
suspect that the lack of findings on opportunism may also relates to how opportunistic managers 
play the expanded {bias or not, disavow or not} strategy. I conjecture that if managers have 
biased an option estimate, they will not also disavow (in part to avoid calling attention to the 
bias). Conversely, if managers have disavowed, they will not also bias (again, to avoid calling 
attention to the bias). If this conjecture is correct, there will a negative correlation between 
opportunism in disavowals and opportunism in option estimates, and as I illustrate in Section 4, 
BFJL’s tests will not find evidence of opportunism in disavowals, even when opportunism 
exists.2   
2. The disavowal disclosure 
Consider the disavowal disclosure from Intel’s 2001 annual report that BFJL report at the 
start of their paper. The disclosure consists of three sentences, which I paraphrase as follows: 
                                                          
1 There are a number of observable ex ante and ex post benchmark volatility benchmarks, and these benchmarks 
likely constrain managers’ ability to manipulate volatility estimates. Evidence in Aboody et al (2006) is consistent 
with this conjecture. 
2 BFJL conduct their tests under an alternative assumption that when managers disavow, they will also bias, and if 
managers play this strategy, BFJL’s tests can detect opportunism. 
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1. The Black-Scholes model was developed for estimating the fair value of traded options, 
not employee options. 
2. It requires highly subjective assumptions.  
3. It does not necessarily provide a reliable single measure of the fair value of employee 
stock options.  
If accounting information is reliable, it is “reasonably free from error and bias and 
faithfully represents what it purports to represent” (FASB Concepts Statement 2, p. 6). Another 
way of saying this is that information is reliable if it is representationally faithful and verifiable. 
The first sentence of Intel’s disavowal disclosure states that the Black-Scholes model was 
developed for traded options, not employee options, and this statement is re-emphasized in the 
third sentence. With these statements, Intel seems to saying that the Black-Scholes model is not a 
representationally faithful model of employee option expense. The second sentence notes that 
option valuation models require the use of highly subjective assumptions. Subjective here is in 
contrast to the objective input needed for a calculation to be verifiable. “Objective accounting 
information is free of measurer bias” (Storey and Storey, 1998, p. 111). If an input is subjective, 
it is not objective, and therefore not verifiable and not reliable. Thus, the first sentence questions 
representational faithfulness, the second sentence questions verifiability, and the third sentence 
concludes that in the absence of these characteristics of reliability, options pricing models are not 
necessarily reliable. Accordingly, the three sentences seem to make the following three points: 
1. Employee option valuation models are not representationally faithful. 
2. The required inputs are subjective, and therefore not verifiable. 
3. Conclusion: Employee option valuation models are not necessarily reliable.  
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It is important to note that Intel’s disclosure, and many others like it that often appear in 
financial reports, is not a model of transparency. The concluding phrase “not necessarily … 
reliable” roughly means “may not be reliable,” and is a much weaker and more indirect statement 
than “not reliable.” It is not plain English. Similar to adding “may not be,” adding “not 
necessarily” to a statement converts the claim to something that is always true, but is a very weak 
claim. The use of indirect, weak language such as “not necessarily” and “may not be” is common 
to many financial disclosures such as disclosures of risk factors, use of estimates, and future 
results, and SOC expense disavowals are not unique in this regard. However, the word 
“disavowal” seems too strong a description for the weak statement “not necessarily … reliable.” 
A better term might be “question” (as BFJL use in defining a disavowal as a disclosure that 
“explicitly questions the reliability of the SOC estimate”, p. 8).  
The most straightforward statement is: “require the use of highly subjective 
assumptions.” This statement seems a straightforward warning to the reader that the option 
estimates are not verifiable. However, in Intel’s disclosure, and in many other disavowal 
disclosures, this transparent statement is then followed by a half-truth. Management singles out 
volatility as an example of a subjective assumption, and no doubt there is more subjectivity in 
selecting a volatility parameter than there is in selecting the risk-free rate or the expected 
dividend. However, as BFJL rely upon in their empirical work, there are a variety of observable 
ex ante and ex post measures of volatility that outsiders can use to benchmark management’s 
volatility estimate. In contrast, estimating the expected life of the options seems more subjective, 
in part because outsiders have little ability to benchmark it (there are no market proxies for 
expected life comparable to implied volatility for expected volatility), and in part because 
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forecasting volatility is a more studied and more tractable problem than forecasting option life. If 
a firm wanted to single out a subjective parameter, it would be option life, not volatility.   
 On the other hand, it is important to note that there are limits to managers’ subjectivity. 
While managers must estimate volatility and expected life, they must use a methodology that is 
applied consistently each period. Both SFAS 123 and 123R describe various methodologies 
management can apply. For example, management might use implied volatility based on traded 
options to estimate volatility. The auditors, and audit committee, will make sure management's 
approach is applied consistently each fiscal period. Management cannot not simply pull these 
estimates out of thin air. Once management has chosen a method, the auditors will insure that the 
same approach is applied consistently over time. 
3. What happened to disavowals after 123R implementation? 
 
The discussion in section 2 suggests that at least three types of language are associated 
with disavowal disclosures: (1) a suggestion that the option pricing model is not 
representationally faithful; (2) a statement about the “subjective” nature of the inputs to the 
option valuation model; (3) and concluding language that suggests the expense is “not 
necessarily … reliable.” In this section, I attempt to shed light on the evolution of the 
disclosures.  
I conduct searches for this language across all 10-K’s in the WRDS SEC access 
platform.3 To generate a sample with restrictions similar to BFJL, I restrict my sample to (1) 
firms on Execucomp; (2) firms with CEO tenure and total pay; (3) firms that made option grants 
to one or more executives in a fiscal year; (4) firms for which at least 12 months of trading data 
is available on CRSP; and (5) firms with non-missing Compustat data on the identity of the 
                                                          
3  The advantage of the WRDS SEC access platform is that it generates a SAS dataset with 10-K dates and firm IDs; 
a disadvantage is that the searches take several days to run. I thank Rabih Moussawi for his excellent help with SAS 
programs and with other issues in accessing the WRDS SEC access platform. 
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firms’ auditors. The second column of Table 1 shows that this procedure generates a sample of 
1,384 observations in 2001 as compared to 1,341 in BFJL. This difference in sample size may 
occur because of additional sample restrictions in BFJL. BFJL use a constant a sample 
selectedstarting in 2001, and the sample sizeis design results in decreases in observations over 
time as firms drop because acquisition or distress. I do not impose this selection, and my sample 
increases in numbers from 2001 to 2003, but then decreases over time as fewer firms use options.  
The third column of Table 1 shows the results of a search on the phrase “not necessarily 
provide a reliable single measure.” BFJL classify a firm-year as “having a disavowal if the firm 
includes a statement in that year’s SOC footnote that explicitly questions the reliability of the 
SOC estimate or the resulting pro forma income” (p. 8). This seems to indicate that their search 
concentrates on the third sentence of the Intel example above that includes the word “reliable.” 
My single search term “not necessarily provide a reliable single measure” produces percentages 
comparable to BFJL. For example, I find 12.2% (6.4%) reliability questions in 2001 (2005) as 
compared to 14.6% (8.4%) in BFJL. This suggests that most of the disavowals in BFJL’s sample 
contain the “not necessarily … reliable” language. 
The fourth column of the table reports results for a search that looks for the words “traded 
options” within 10 words of the words “no vesting restrictions.” This search returns option 
disclosures that suggest that employee option valuation models are not representationally 
faithful. The fifth column of the table reports results for a search that looks for the stem 
“subjective” within 20 words of the stem “option.” This search returns option disclosures that 
emphasize the non-verifiability of option inputs using references to “subjective assumptions,” 
“highly subjective assumptions,” “subjective inputs,” etc.4  The more straightforward “traded 
                                                          
4  These search terms also yields some inappropriate results, such as “options awarded subjectively,” and I inspect 
for and remove these by hand. 
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options…no vesting restrictions” and the stronger “subjective” language is about as frequent than 
as the “not necessarily … reliable” language from 1996 to 2005. For example, I find 12.0% 
(9.9%) uses of the subjective language in 2001 (2005). The final column shows the percentage of 
firms that use at least one of the types of language associated with the disavowal disclosure. 
Interestingly, while the “not necessarily … reliable” language essentially disappears after 123R, 
consistent with BFJL’s findings, dropping to less than 1% of the sample in 2009, which is 
consistent with BFJL’s findings. In contrast, but the other two types of language continues, 
although less frequentalso at a decreasing rate: the percentage of firms using one or more types 
of disavowal language dis rops to about 89.49% in 2009.5  
In summary, consistent with BFJL, the concluding language “not necessarily … reliable” 
does seem to vanish, but other types of disavowal language persists, including stronger phrasing 
such as “highly subjective assumptions.”  
4. Little evidence of opportunism?  
 
It seems well established that some managers manipulate disclosure in general, and that 
some managers manipulate option disclosures in particular. Much prior literature predicts and 
finds that there is a positive association between opportunism and bias in reported option 
estimates. So, as noted above, it seems puzzling that BFJL find little evidence of opportunism in 
disavowal disclosures.  
In this section, I illustrate that the unique nature of the option expense and disavowal 
disclosure strategy may make it difficult to find evidence of opportunism even if opportunism is 
                                                          
5 In untabulated results, I find that, as in BFJL, Ernst and Young (E&Y) clients use the disavowal language quite 
differently that than do the clients of other audit firms. 28.7% (4.6%) of E&Y (non- E&Y) clients use the language 
“not necessarily … reliable” in the 1996 to 2005 pre-123R period, and this percentage drops to 2.3% (0.8%) post-
123R. For E&Y clients, there is a significant decrease post 123R in the percentage of firms that use one or more 
types of disavowal language (from 35.0% to 12.0%), while the clients of other auditors show an increase (from 7.4% 
to 9.1%).  
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present. To do this, I construct the example summarized in Table 2. The example assumes that: 
(1) managers wish to minimize the personal costs of option disclosure; (2) half of the managers 
are informative, and the other half are opportunistic (as shown in Column 2); (3) 10% of the 
managers make disavowals (roughly consistent with about 12% of BFJL’s sample making 
disavowals); (4) half of the disavowals are made by informative managers, and the other half are 
made by opportunistic managers; and (5) the percentage of firms (10%) with reliability 
concerndifficulties (shown in Column 3) is equal to the percentage of managers who make 
disavowals (10%). 
The prior literature considers two strategies: the manager can report truthfully or bias 
their reported option expense. The possibility of a disavowal adds a new dimension to these 
strategies – in addition, the manager can choose whether to disavow or not. For a manager who 
wishes to be informative, the additional possibility of disavowing does not expand his strategy 
set – his goal is to maximize the informativeness of the option disclosure, and he will report 
option parameters truthfully. This strategy is shown in the two first rows of the table. If the 
informative manager sees no reliability difficulty (Column 3), he does not disavow (strategy 1A). 
If he sees a reliability difficulty, he disavows (strategy 1B). For a manager who is opportunistic, 
however, the availability of the disavowal expands the strategy set to become {bias or not, 
disavow or not}. An opportunistic manager’s broad goal is to minimize shareholder perceptions 
of option expense, and he will choose the pair {bias or not, disavow or not} that minimizes 
shareholder perceptions. He may accomplish this by biasing option parameters and/or by 
convincing shareholders to give the expense less weight because it is not reliable.  For an 
opportunistic manager, then, there are three strategies. First, he can bias disclosure and disavow 
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(strategy 2). Second, he can bias disclosure and not disavow (strategy 3). Third and finally, he 
can choose not to bias disclosure but to disavow (strategy 4).  
With the set-up in the first five columns in the Table, consider a traditional experimental 
design such as Aboody et al. (2006) that examines the association between opportunism and bias 
in option parameters. Essentially, this is a regression of Bias (Column 5) on Manager Type 
(Column 1). So long as some of the opportunistic managers bias option estimates (i.e., they do 
not all play strategy 4), it is easy to see that there is a positive association between opportunism 
and bias.  
When the opportunism choice is two-dimensional, {bias or not, disavow or not}, whether 
one can find an association between opportunism and disavowals depends on what strategies the 
opportunistic managers choose. Given the assumptions above, it is easy to see that 45% of 
managers will be informative and make no disavowal (strategy 1A), and that 5% of managers 
will be informative and make a disavowal (strategy 1B). It is more difficult to think 
throughidentify what strategies the opportunistic managers will play. BFJL make the following 
assumption about opportunistic managers’ choices: 
We assume that a firm’s various SOC disclosures reflect the same managerial motives. 
Accordingly, if disavowals are opportunistic, disavowal managers’ volatility estimates 
also reflect opportunism and thus are downward biased. (p. 3) 
 
This means that if a manager is disavowing opportunistically (that is, claims reliability difficulty 
where there is no difficulty), BFJL assume that the managers will also bias option estimates, that 
is, play strategy 2. Under the assumption that 5% of the opportunistic managers disavow, 5% of 
managers play strategy 2 (as shown in Column 7). The BFJL assumption further suggests that no 
managers will play strategy 4, and the remaining 45% will play strategy 3.6 If managers are 
                                                          
6 Note that strategy 3 is in fact opportunistic – the manager knows that his option estimate is unreliable (since he 
biased it), so the lack of a disavowal is opportunistic. 
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distributed as shown in Column (7), BFJL’s tests, in particular the tests in Table 4, will find 
opportunism. BFJL’s test in Table 4 amounts to testing whether Bias (column 5) is non-zero for 
the disavowal firms (strategies 1B and 2).  Since half of the disavowal managers are 
opportunistic, and are biasing their option estimates, this test will detect opportunism. So if in 
fact managers who used disavowals opportunistically also biased their option expense estimates, 
the BFJL tests would find opportunism. 
Is the assumption that opportunistic managers pair opportunistic disavowals with biased 
estimates the only plausible strategy? If a manager biases an estimate and then also disavows that 
estimate, is his disavowal opportunistic? In other words, when the manager disavows after 
biasing an estimate, his disavowal is informative (not opportunistic) in that the estimate is in fact 
unreliable because the manager has biased it. Disavowing following a biased estimate seems also 
a questionable strategy because the disavowal is an unusual disclosure, and may have the effect 
of calling attention to the bias. On the other hand, the disavowal may provide cover if the 
estimate is later discovered to be biased. 
Strategy 4 also seems also to be a plausible place to locate the 5% opportunistic 
disavowals – see Column (8). The disavowal is in fact opportunistic (the manager is saying 
something is unreliable when in fact it is not). Also, the manager is not calling attention to 
himself by in addition biasing the disclosure.   
Suppose that instead of Strategy 2 managers play Strategy 4 as shown in Column 8. With 
this change, none of the BFJL tests will detect opportunism. This is easy to see for BFJL’s test in 
Table 4, which tests whether Bias (column 5) is non-zero for the disavowal firms (strategies 1B 
and 4).  Here, by assumption, half of the disavowal managers are opportunistic, and are using 
disavowals in an opportunistic manner, but they are unbiased., Sso this test does not detect 
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opportunism. Now consider a univariate version of the test in BFJL’s Table 3 that correlates the 
choice to disavow with proxies for opportunism. This is a regression of Disavow (Column 6) on 
Manager Type (Column 1). By the assumptions in the table, the same proportion, 5%/50%, of 
both the informative and opportunistic managers disavow, so there is no association between 
opportunism and disavowals. But the test in BFJL’s Table 3 is multivariate, and also contains 
proxies for when option estimates are likely to be less reliable. Essentially, this test is a 
regression of Disavow (column 6) on Manager Type (column 1) and on Reliability Difficulty 
(Column 3). In my example, however, the same proportion, 5%/50%, of both the informative and 
opportunistic managers disavow have Reliability Difficulty, so Reliability Difficulty is 
uncorrelated with Opportunism. That means thatHence, including a control for Reliability 
Difficulty in the regression does not change the zero coefficient on opportunism, and the Table 3 
tests in this example will therefore not detect opportunism.  
It is useful to consider whether one could design a test to detect opportunism if the 
opportunistic disavowers claimed reliability difficulty when there is none (strategy 4). In this 
case, if one considered disavowers only, there should be a predictable relation between a proxy 
for opportunism and a proxy for “bias in disavowal.” For example, the unsigned forecast errors 
in BFJL Table 5 panel C could be used as a proxy for “bias in disavowal.” If these forecast errors 
were small, this would suggest a disavowal when there was no reliability difficulty. However, 
the test may be weak because it would be conducted on the disavowers only, and the proxies for 
opportunism and for bias in disavowal may be noisy. In addition, if some managers played 
strategy 2 while others played strategy 4, both this test and BFJL’s tests in Table 4 could be 
weak. 
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In conclusion, BFJL’s inference that disavowals are not opportunistic relies on their 
assumption that if opportunistic managers disavow, they bias option estimates as well. I suggest 
an alternative assumption that also seems plausible. Under this assumption, I construct an 
example that shows many managers are opportunistic, and opportunistic managers use 
disavowals in an opportunistic manner, but the BFJL tests will not detect opportunism. The 
sensitivity of inference highlights the difficulties researchers face once they examine managers 
with more than one dimension to their disclosure strategies: To develop powerful tests, 
researchers need to anticipate exactlyspecify the full set of  which strategies that managers can 
play and to recognize that these tests are in fact testing joint hypotheses. 
5. Conclusion 
 
BFJL identify a very interesting disclosure and add to our understanding of firm disclosure 
of option expense. In this discussion, I suggest that the disclosure is more nuanced than is 
suggested by the term disavowal. Some of the disclosures are the weak, almost tautological “not 
necessarily … reliable” whereas others are more straightforward statements about the “subjective 
nature” of the inputs to the option valuation model. Consistent with findings in BFJL, the “not 
necessarily … reliable” language largely disappears after SFAS 123R, while other, stronger 
language persists. One of the most striking findings in BFJL is lack of opportunism in 
disavowals, but I suggest that it is preliminary to conclude that there is no opportunism. 
Even if we knew that the disavowals were non-opportunistic, and even if the disclosures 
themselves were completely straightforward and transparent, it is not clear how useful they are to 
readers of financial statements. A straightforward statement that option expense is reliable or is 
not reliable gives the reader some qualitative sense about whether measurement error in the 
expense is relatively low or high., Bbut where is the line drawn between low and high error?, and 
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Why not could we not have degrees of reliability rather than a bifurcationhigh/low split? Instead 
of a reliability assessment, it seems that perhaps a more useful disclosure would be more detail 
on how the estimates were constructed. In other words, instead of saying whether the estimate is 
subjective (verifiable) or not, why not create more verifiability by detailing how the estimate was 
computed? For example, in its 2007 stock option footnote, Intel gives the following detail on its 
volatility estimate: “We use implied volatility based on freely traded options in the open market, 
as we believe implied volatility is more reflective of market conditions and a better indicator of 
expected volatility than historical volatility.” On the other hand, in the same footnote, Intel, a 
large, sophisticated and long-time user of stock options, claims not to know how to estimate the 
expected life of its options: “Due to significant differences in the vesting terms and contractual 
life of current option grants compared to the majority of our historical grants, management does 
not believe that our historical share option exercise data provides us with sufficient evidence to 
estimate expected term.”  So for those like BFJL who are willing to dig into the verbiage of 
option disclosures, there seem to be continuing opportunities for examining and understanding 
what managers are saying about the precision of their disclosures and for further understanding 
managers’ disclosure motives.   
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Table 1 
Evolution of language “Not necessarily … reliable,” “traded options … no vesting restrictions,” “subjective” in firms’ stock 
option disclosures 
Table summarizes searches of a sample of 10-Ks from the WRDS SEC access platform. Sample is firms on Execucomp that have CEO tenure and total pay, 
made option grants to one or more executives in a fiscal year, had at least 12 months of trading data is available on CRSP, and had non-missing Compustat data 
on the identity of the firms’ auditors. The third, fourth, and fifth columns shows the percentage of the sample with language  “not necessarily provide a reliable 
single measure,” “traded options” w/10 words of “no vesting restrictions,” and with the stem “subjective” w/20 words of “option.” “One or more” indicates the 
use of one more types of disavowal language. 
 
Year N 
Not 
necessarily  
… reliable 
Traded 
options … 
no vesting 
restrictions Subjective 
One or 
more 
1996  1,140  7.5% 8.3% 8.4% 9.6% 
1997  1,243  12.6% 12.8% 13.4% 15.4% 
1998  1,360  11.3% 11.5% 11.9% 14.1% 
1999  1,354  11.6% 10.3% 11.4% 13.7% 
2000  1,351  12.3% 10.6% 11.9% 14.1% 
2001  1,384  12.2% 10.6% 12.0% 14.7% 
2002  1,405  11.3% 10.7% 12.3% 15.4% 
2003  1,410  11.1% 11.1% 12.7% 16.2% 
2004  1,339  10.3% 11.3% 12.3% 16.3% 
2005  1,290  6.4% 9.1% 9.9% 13.6% 
2006  1,205  1.7% 5.5% 7.2% 11.0% 
2007  1,226  1.2% 4.6% 7.1% 10.4% 
2008  1,200  1.1% 5.0% 6.7% 9.9% 
2009  1,115  0.6% 4.1% 5.6% 8.4% 
   
 
 
 
Periods: 
  
 
 
 
Pre-123R 1996-2005  13,276  10.7% 10.7% 11.7% 14.3% 
Post-123R 2006-2009  4,746  1.2%* 4.8%* 6.7%* 9.9%* 
 
* Indicates language percentage is significantly lower in years after 123R than before. 
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Table 2 
Example: Distribution of informative and opportunistic managers and summary of disclosure strategies 
 
      Fraction of Managers 
Playing Strategy 
 
(1) 
Manager 
Type 
(2) 
Fraction 
of 
Managers 
 
(3) 
Reliability 
Difficulty? 
 
 
(4) 
Strategy 
(5) 
Bias 
Option 
Expense? 
 
 
(6) 
Disavow? 
 
(7) 
BFJL 
Assumption 
 
(8) 
Alternative 
Assumption 
Informative 
50% 
0% 1A No No  45% 45% 
Informative 5% 1B No Yes  5% 5% 
Opportunistic 
50% 
0% 2 Yes Yes 5% 0% 
Opportunistic 5% 3 Yes No  45% 45% 
Opportunistic 0% 4 No Yes 0% 5% 
 
